Excerpt from the article by Alain Supiot, “Revue Défense Nationale” 2022/2 (No. 847), pp. 30-38

In a letter to Father Mersenne dated April 15, 1630, Descartes justified his belief in the inviolability of mathematical truths in these terms: “It is God who established these laws in nature, just as a king establishes laws in his kingdom… It will be said that if God established these truths, he could change them as a king makes his laws; to which the answer is yes, if his will can change. – But I understand them as eternal and immutable. – And I judge God in the same way” (1). These few lines illuminate the diversity of the facets – theological, legal, and epistemological – of sovereignty, whose genealogy must be traced to understand its place in de Gaulle’s work.

The concept of sovereignty was forged at the same time as that of the State by medieval jurists and theologians, for whom the primary figure of the sovereign was the all-powerful God of the Old Testament (2). Being a product of the institutional history of Western Europe, these concepts of State and sovereignty cannot be projected without caution onto earlier periods or other civilizations. Classical Roman law ignores sovereignty, the political sphere being conceived through the notions of imperium, potestas, auctoritas, or ius (3). Similarly, to take just one example, Japan did without it until the 19th century, when it adopted it in order to be recognized as a “sovereign State” by Western powers; but this adoption gave rise to definitions of sovereignty unknown in the West (4). It is therefore essential not to confuse the generality of the problem that sovereignty addresses with the specificity of the solution it provides.

This general problem is the one Descartes poses concerning mathematical truths: how can we be certain of certain laws in a finite world, when the infinite universe to which it belongs remains largely inscrutable to us? Thus formulated, this problem is not only theological, but also epistemological, for it leads to the recognition that, faced with an infinite universe, humankind can only acquire finite knowledge on its own. The recognition of this finitude, at the dawn of the Renaissance, opened an indefinite field for scientific progress, without ever being able to claim to attain absolute truth, which belongs to religion and not to science (5). Such is the meaning of the “learned ignorance” promoted by Nicholas of Cusa at the dawn of the Renaissance (6), the equivalent of which is found in this Malian proverb recounted by the philosopher Amadou Hampâté Bâ: “He who knows that he does not know, will know; he who does not know that he does not know, will not know.”

Across the continent, Africa’s food dependency is estimated at around 19%. However, this overall figure masks significant disparities between countries and between different categories of food products.

Some regions are particularly dependent on imports. This is notably the case for several small island states or countries with severe climatic constraints. Djibouti, for example, has a dependency rate exceeding 150%, while the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Botswana also surpass 100%. In these economies, geographical or environmental conditions severely limit local agricultural production.

In other regions, particularly in North Africa, food dependency is at intermediate levels. Morocco, for example, has a rate of around 48%, while Algeria and Tunisia are around 38% and 37% respectively.

Conversely, some of the continent’s major agricultural producers appear largely self-sufficient. Malawi, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, for example, have dependency rates of less than 10%, thanks to significant local agricultural production.

However, this apparent self-sufficiency can be misleading. Even relatively self-reliant countries, such as Uganda, remain heavily dependent on imports for certain key products, including wheat, vegetable oils, and sugar. This situation creates a paradox: locally produced food can remain affordable, while a more diversified diet becomes expensive due to dependence on international markets.

Thus, the real issue of food security in Africa is not limited to the overall volume of production, but also concerns the structure of imports and the diversification of agricultural systems.

When examining natural resource exports in Africa, oil and gas often dominate the analysis. However, removing hydrocarbons from the equation profoundly transforms the continent’s economic landscape, revealing the true power of solid mining.

In this ranking of non-oil and gas mining exports, South Africa is far ahead with approximately $52.2 billion. The country boasts a diversified mining sector based on platinum, gold, diamonds, as well as iron, copper, nickel, and certain rare earth elements. The Democratic Republic of Congo holds second place with nearly $48.7 billion in exports, dominated by copper and cobalt. The latter represents about 60% of global supply, giving the country strategic importance in the energy transition.

Zambia ranks third with approximately $16.7 billion in exports, primarily related to copper from its renowned Copperbelt. Egypt occupies fourth place with $11.4 billion, thanks in particular to copper, iron, and certain rare earth elements. Finally, Guinea completes the ranking with approximately $8.9 billion, driven by its vast bauxite reserves, among the largest in the world.

These five countries alone account for nearly 67% of African non-hydrocarbon mineral exports. Conversely, countries heavily dependent on oil, such as Nigeria, Algeria, and Angola, have fallen sharply in the rankings. This shift reveals the growing strategic importance of minerals in the global economy and underscores the need for Africa to strengthen the local processing of its mineral resources.

Africa possesses one of the world’s largest reserves of natural resources. In 2024, African exports of minerals and energy resources—including oil, gas, precious metals, copper, iron, and rare earth elements—reached approximately $422 billion. However, this wealth is heavily concentrated in a limited number of countries.

Five countries dominate the continent’s mineral and energy exports. South Africa leads the way with nearly $62.8 billion in exports, driven by a wide variety of resources, including platinum, gold, diamonds, coal, iron, and steel. It is followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose exports reach approximately $49.4 billion, primarily due to copper and cobalt. Cobalt alone accounts for nearly 60% of global supply.

Nigeria ranks third with $48.7 billion in exports, dominated by oil and gas. Algeria follows with approximately $45.7 billion, also supported by hydrocarbons and a growing steel sector. Angola completes the ranking with nearly $35.9 billion in oil exports.

In total, these five countries alone account for approximately $242 billion, or nearly 58% of all African mineral exports. The top ten countries alone account for almost 78% of these exports.

This high concentration illustrates both the continent’s geological wealth and the regional disparities in resource exploitation. It also underscores the importance for African countries to develop local processing chains in order to capture more added value.

Africa’s rapid urbanization is often presented as one of the drivers of the continent’s economic transformation. Yet, behind the narrative of a “growing Africa,” a more nuanced reality emerges: in many cities, urban expansion is accompanied by a sharp increase in informal settlements.

A clear geographical divide exists between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. In several North African countries, the proportion of the urban population living in slums remains relatively low, generally less than 20%. Egypt, for example, has a rate of around 3.8%, the result of significant investments in urban planning, infrastructure, and housing policies.

Conversely, in much of sub-Saharan Africa, more than half of the urban population lives in informal settlements. The most extreme situations are found in South Sudan, where approximately 94% of urban dwellers live in slums, but also in Mali (92%), Burkina Faso (87%), and Chad (82%).

However, some countries offer more encouraging examples. Eswatini has one of the lowest rates in sub-Saharan Africa at around 17%, while South Africa, with 24.2%, stands out among the region’s major economies.

These differences highlight a key factor: the quality of urban planning. Countries that have invested in infrastructure, land-use planning, and land tenure security have lower rates of informal settlements.

If current trends continue, sub-Saharan Africa could have approximately 360 million more inhabitants living in slums by 2030. The real challenge, therefore, is not urbanization itself, but the capacity to organize and sustainably manage it.

When discussing interest rates in Africa, attention often focuses on extreme cases. Countries like Zimbabwe, with a policy rate nearing 35%, or Ghana, around 28%, illustrate the difficulties faced by some economies grappling with high inflation and monetary instability. However, these dramatic situations do not reflect the full diversity of the African financial landscape.

In several countries across the continent, policy rates remain relatively low, reflecting stronger macroeconomic stability. In Botswana, for example, the interest rate is around 1.9%. This relatively low level is part of a financial environment characterized by high levels of financial inclusion, with nearly 69% of the population having access to banking services. Similarly, Morocco has a policy rate of approximately 2.25%, supported by a relatively stable and growing economy.

Conversely, economies like Nigeria and Zimbabwe are forced to maintain high interest rates to contain inflationary pressures and stabilize their currencies. In Nigeria, for example, the policy rate is around 27.5% in a context of inflation close to 28%.

These discrepancies illustrate a veritable “lottery” of interest rates across the continent, reflecting differences in economic structures, monetary policies, and levels of financial development. It is important to remember, however, that these figures correspond to central bank policy rates. In practice, the rates applied by commercial banks are generally two to five percentage points higher, which directly impacts the real cost of credit for businesses and households.

According to IMF projections for 2026, the issue of public debt in Africa can no longer be analyzed as a uniform phenomenon. While some countries remain in extremely worrying situations, debt trajectories across the continent now show a significant divergence.

Three countries remain in a critical zone, with debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 100%: Sudan, Senegal, and Cabo Verde. These high debt levels pose major challenges to fiscal sustainability and repayment capacity.

At the same time, the overall trend across the continent shows a relative improvement. The African average debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to fall from 65.8% in 2024 to around 60.8% in 2026. This development is largely due to some successful debt restructurings. Ghana, for example, has reduced its debt-to-GDP ratio by approximately 14 percentage points, while Zimbabwe has seen an even more dramatic decrease of over 30 points.

However, the situation is deteriorating in several commodity-dependent economies. In Botswana, the fall in diamond revenues has led to a sharp increase in debt, rising from 29.9% to 44.8% of GDP. Algeria is also experiencing a significant increase in its debt, which has reached 62.2% of GDP amid an oil crisis.

Beyond the overall level of debt, the real challenge now lies in its cost. Debt servicing currently absorbs nearly 18.7% of public revenue in sub-Saharan Africa, almost three times more than in 2014, which significantly reduces budgetary margins for investment and development.

In the context of increasing global competition for energy and critical metals, Africa is gradually establishing itself as a central geoeconomic player. Long perceived as a mere extractive periphery, the continent now occupies a strategic position in global energy and industrial security.

In the north of the continent, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt constitute a major energy hub. Their hydrocarbon resources contribute significantly to the energy supply of Europe and, to a lesser extent, some Asian economies. Further south, the Gulf of Guinea, dominated by Nigeria and Angola, remains one of the main oil-producing regions in Africa. However, these areas remain vulnerable to maritime shocks and fluctuations in international prices.

To the east and center, another strategic area is emerging: the Democratic Republic of Congo – Zambia – Tanzania axis. This region contains significant reserves of cobalt, copper, and tantalum, minerals essential for manufacturing batteries, digital technologies, and the infrastructure of the global energy transition.

In the south, South Africa and Namibia, alongside Niger, are participating in the integration of the continent into strategic nuclear and metallurgical supply chains thanks to their uranium and industrial mineral resources.

However, a structural weakness persists: the low value capture associated with the raw export of resources. The major challenge for Africa no longer lies solely in the possession of deposits, but in the capacity to develop local processing chains, efficient logistics corridors, and genuine regional technological sovereignty.

By 2026, renting accommodation in several major African capitals is becoming increasingly expensive. Cities like Lagos and Abidjan now top the rankings for rental prices, with indices of 23.4 and 23.3 respectively. They are followed by Cape Town (22.2) and Addis Ababa (20.9). This trend reflects the profound urban transformations currently taking place across the continent.

The rise in rents is primarily due to rapid urbanization. Every year, millions of Africans migrate to major cities in search of economic opportunities, jobs, and a better quality of life. This concentration of economic activity in a few metropolitan areas attracts ever-increasing numbers of people and puts growing pressure on the housing market.

However, the housing supply is failing to keep pace with this growing demand. In many cities, urban infrastructure and construction programs remain insufficient to absorb population growth. This situation contributes to soaring prices and exacerbates inequalities in access to housing.

Today, nearly 45% of Africans live in urban areas, a proportion expected to increase in the coming decades. In this context, the rental market becomes a key indicator of the continent’s economic dynamics, but also of the social tensions that can arise from them.

Faced with this situation, urban policies and investments in affordable housing appear as major challenges to support the growth of African cities while limiting the risks of social pressure.

Africa is the second continent, far behind Asia, in terms of the number of fishing vessels, but this fleet is the least motorized on the planet, with only 1/3 of the boats having an engine. The continent therefore places only one country, Morocco, in 17th place worldwide out of the 25 countries representing 82% of world fishing.

On the part of Africans, this is subsistence and artisanal fishing employing many workers; in 2014, there were 5.7 million fishermen and fish farmers in Africa, and “fish provides a livelihood for some 30 to 45 million Africans.”

This sector, however, shows weak performance. The per capita fish supply in Africa is only 9.8 kg per year, making it the second lowest in the world, compared to the global average of 19.7 kg. Fish processing also faces significant challenges, with post-capture losses estimated between 20–25% and, in some cases, reaching up to 50%. Inland fishing remains largely unindustrialized, except in parts of East Africa’s Great Lakes region (Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, and Lake Malawi). Like sea fishing, inland fisheries are experiencing declining catches due to pollution, environmental degradation, and overexploitation. Aquaculture production is also the lowest in the world, with North Africa being the most productive region at just over 5 kg per person, while other African sub-regions produce less than 1 kg per person.

Aquaculture, total capture production, and capture for human consumption (Source OECD/FAO (2022)

Sea fishing is industrialized, but much of the exploitation is driven by European and Chinese companies, which tend to deplete resources. Most fish catch now comes from the exclusive economic zones of coastal countries such as Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, while high-seas fishing has significantly declined. Beyond industrial overfishing, illegal fishing also poses a major challenge, leading to significant economic losses for African nations.

Fishing contributes to Africa’s positive trade balance, as the continent has generally been a net exporter in terms of value since 1985. However, in terms of volume, it has long been a net importer, reflecting the lower unit value of imported species, particularly small pelagic fish.

Fish is crucial to the continent’s food security, accounting for 22% of animal protein intake in sub-Saharan Africa, and up to 50% in areas where other protein sources are scarce or expensive. In coastal West Africa, the proportion of animal protein coming from fish is particularly high, with countries like Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana relying heavily on fish for nutrition.

Inland Africa also depends on inland fisheries, which provide essential food and livelihoods for communities near rivers and wetlands. Even more surprisingly, fish plays a key role in the diets of communities in the continent’s drylands.

According to OECD (2023), in order to ensure food security, global fish production is projected to increase by 1.2% per year and is expected to reach 203 Mt by 2031, an overall increase of 25 Mt (+14%) compared to the base period (average 2019-2021), and by 2031, global aquaculture production is projected to reach 108 Mt, 12 Mt more than the capture sector. Aquaculture in total fish supply will reach 53% in 2031 compared to 49% in the 2020 period.

Fisheries catches increased from 7 million tonnes to 10 million tonnes in 2020, while aquaculture production was around 450,000 tonnes in 2000, increasing to almost 2 million 420,000 tonnes in 2020 (FAO, 2024).

The 2.4 million tonnes of African aquaculture products are not evenly distributed across the continent. For decades, there have been large disparities in aquaculture production, with significant growth in North, West, and East Africa since the 2000s (Fig. 5). Of the total 2.4 million tonnes, North Africa accounts for nearly 70% (almost all produced by Egypt), West Africa produces 16.06%, and East Africa contributes 15.70%. Central and Southern Africa produce less than 1.3% (FAO, 2024).

For more information :

• https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portail:Afrique
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa
• https://africacenter.org/
• https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/
• https://etudes-africaines.cnrs.fr/
• https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/
• https://www.afdb.org/fr/documents-publications/economic-perspectives-en-afrique-2024